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HISTORICAL NUGGETS
Robert Chatov
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
AT BUFFALO

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS ON THE TRANSFER OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S
AUTHORITY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
RULES FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING
Abstract: As an SEC Commissioner, William O. Douglas favored active SEC participation in the development of rules of accounting for financial reporting under
the Securities Acts. A retrospective letter dated September 29, 1973 indicates that
the pre-War SEC Commission did not contemplate the virtually complete transfer
to the private sector of the authority for development of corporate financial reporting that characterizes the position of today's SEC.

The present initiative for corporate financial reporting rules is
in the hands of the private sector, and there are serious doubts in
the minds of some contemporary Congressmen about the wisdom
of that arrangement. As of this writing, a year-long series of hearings was being conducted by a major House subcommittee into
Securities and Exchange Commission oversight of the accounting
profession. The hearings covered arrangements for the development of rules for corporate financial reporting and auditing standards. The manner in which those rules became institutionalized
in the private sector has been spelled out elsewhere [Chatov, 1975]
and need not be covered in this paper. What is at issue at the
present time is the question of the vesting in private groups of
functions originally specified as governmental responsibilities.
Regardless of the desirability of having a self-regulating, profitoriented professional group control the rules under which they
carry out their business operations, over a period of some fifty
years the control of those functions has become increasingly institutionalized in private hands. This clearly makes for a form of
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legitimacy through de facto operations, rather far from any kind
of authorized de jure process or intention.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to inquire into the origins of that
process and to see what were the views of the original members
of the Commission when the transfer of authority to the private
sector began to occur. One Commissioner was William O. Douglas,
appointed SEC Commissioner in January, 1936, and Chief Commissioner in September, 1937 (on James M. Landis' resignation)
until in April, 1939 he resigned to take a seat on the U.S. Supreme
Court. His thirty-six years on the bench of the Supreme Court was
the longest tenure of any Supreme Court Justice in U.S. history.
Douglas' views on law are well known, and he was regarded as
an important champion of civil and constitutional rights. His views
on business were influenced by his studies of corporate financial
operations as a member of the Yale Law School faculty, studies
which served him well on the Securities and Exchange Commission.
He was known as "firm" when it came to the business sector, but
was not considered an enemy [New York Times, 1980]. Douglas was
an activist in most matters, and this characterized his attitude while
an SEC Commissioner, and was reflected in his view that the SEC
should take a leading role in the regulation of corporate financial
reporting.
In response to an inquiry I sent to him in connection with the
background to the initial transfer of authority for corporate financial reporting from the SEC to the private sector in the latter part
of the 1930s, Justice Douglas first wrote that the events were far
enough back that he would have to do some research and recollection before he could respond. Subsequently, I received from him
the following letter, which is reproduced below in its entirety.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543
Chambers of
Justice William O. Douglas

September 29, 1973

Dear Professor Chatov:
I have your letter of August 22nd and as I wrote you the answer
to your questions entailed research on problems raised nearly 40
years ago.
In 1936 and 1937 Robert E. Healy and I thought the Commission
should take the lead in formulating accounting principles as it was
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empowered to do under § 19 (a) of the 1933 Act. No one in the
Commission thought it should be abdicated. All of Us had seen even
partners in the best of firms walk perilously close to the line both
as respects civil and criminal liability. Landis in his speech of
December 4, 1936 before the Investment Bankers said that our
experience with accountants led us to conclude that the form of
financial statements should not be left "to professional responsibility alone" that the SEC had a responsibility to see to it that
financial statements were not permissible if they were misleading.
Carmon A. Blough stated on December 13, 1937 that SEC action
on statements required immediate action but the Commission
often did not have time to do the extensive research necessary to
formulate the correct accounting principles in a given case. Even
though the practice used seemed "improper," the Commission
(over the dissent of Healy and me) often accepted a statement
provided there was in a footnote, a "complete" disclosure of the
questionable matters."
On February 12, 1938 the Commission appointed an intra-agency
committee to work on "rules prescribing accounting practices and
procedures."
Healy's view and mine were reflected in a Commission Release
No. 4 on April 25, 1938:
In cases where financial statements filed with this
Commission pursuant to its rules and regulations under
the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are prepared in accordance with accounting principles for which there is no substantial authoritative support, such financial statements will be presumed to be
misleading or inaccurate despite disclosure contained in
the certificate of the accountant or in footnotes to the
statements provided the matters involved are material. In
cases where there is a difference of opinion between the
Commission and the registrant as to the proper principles
of accounting to be followed, disclosure will be accepted
in lieu of correction of the financial statements themselves
only if the points involved are such that there is substantial authoritative support for the practices followed
by the registrant and the position of the Commission has
not previously been expressed in rules, regulations, or
other official releases of the Commission, including the
published opinions of its chief accountant.
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As I recall George Matthews dissented from that position.
Healy had anticipated that ruling in an address on December
27, 1937 before the American Accounting Association when he said
the Commission was undertaking "to express a few standards as
to principles which we believe are accepted by a majority of good
accountants, especially those who do not assume the role of special
pleaders for their more lucrative clients."
One example he gave was preferred stock issued at $80 a share
with a par value of $40. On its balance sheet the company showed
$40 per share for the preferred and $10 a share as "paid-insurplus." The company claimed the $10 could be used to pay
dividends to the common stock. Healy denounced that practice.
He listed others of like gravity and gave instances where the Commission was divided, the majority clearing registration statements,
though in Healy's view and in mine they were misleading. It was
our view that "if an earnings statement and a balance sheet reflect
the results of improper accounting they amount to misrepresentative and misleading statements in violation of the Security Act."
Healy said that "The Commission will continue its efforts to
develop a body of accounting principles through its decisions."
What happened in my time was a common-law development of
precedents — case by case. Some principles were established by
Commission rulings; others by opinions of the Chief Accountant.
I speak only of the period ending in April 1939 when I left the
Commission. I have not followed the problem since then.
Yours faithfully,
William O. Douglas
Justice Douglas' letter indicates several things about the
subject during his term as SEC Commissioner. First, two of the five
commissioners, including Douglas, wanted the SEC to lead in accounting rule development. The initial mandate to the private
sector had been given in December, 1936, and the first steps toward
institutionalizing it there taken in the following year [Chatov, 1975,
106-32]. Just as important is Douglas' statement that "No one in
the Commission thought it should be abdicated." The next sentences in his letter leave no doubt about why the Commissioners
held that belief. There was the problem of temptation, and the SEC
had an obligation to see that the rules developed were appropriate
to the purpose intended under the Securities Acts. The text of
the SEC's Accounting Series Release No. 4 indicated, as far as
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Douglas was concerned, that the SEC would remain an active
participant in accounting deliberations. Also of note is Douglas' endorsement of Healy's views, quite evident in the above letter.
One can conclude that the present arrangements for the development of financial reporting rules, endorsed in full by the present
SEC Commission, and reaffirmed in Chief Commissioner Shad's
statement before the Dingell Committee on March 6, 1985 [Shad,
1985] were not at all contemplated or endorsed by the members of
the pre-World War II Commission, regardless of the initial transfer
of authority to the American Institute of Accountants in 1936-38.
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